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Abstract
Privacy is a major concern in designing any cryptographic primitive when frequent trans-
actions are done electronically. During electronic transactions, people reveal their personal
data into several servers and believe that this information does not leak too much about
them. The adaptive oblivious transfer with hidden access policy (AOT-HAP) takes measure
against such privacy issues. The existing AOT-HAP involves a sender and multiple receivers
apart from a designated issuer. Security of these schemes rely on the fact that the issuer
cannot collude with a set of receivers. Moreover, they loose security when run with multiple
protocol instances during concurrent execution. We present the first issuer-free AOT-HAP in
universal composable (UC) framework in which the protocol is secure even when composed
with each other or with other protocols. A concrete security analysis is given assuming the
hardness of q-strong Diffie-Hellman (SDH), decision Linear (DLIN) and decision bilinear
Diffie-Hellman (DBDH) problems against malicious adversary in UC model. Moreover, the
protocol outperforms the existing similar schemes.
Keywords Oblivious transfer, attribute based encryption, hidden access policy, non-interactive
zero-knowledge proofs, universal composable security.
1 Introduction
To protect sensitive data, it is required to associate some access policies to the data so that re-
ceivers who have the necessary permissions can access it. Receiver should possess attribute sets
in order to retrieve the data. Upon controlling access to the sensitive data, the associated ac-
cess policy leaks too much information. For instance, consider a scenario of a medical database
consisting of patients records. The access policy associated with each patient’s record includes
patient’s identity, names of treating doctors, names of diseases, medicines recommended, treat-
ments done etc. If access policies are public, then they reveal about the patient’s personal
information. Many patients do not want to disclose their identities when they undergo a plas-
tic surgical operation, a psychiatric treatment etc. Sometimes, even doctors want to remain
anonymous while treating a famous person. The solution to such privacy problems is adaptive
oblivious transfer realizing hidden access policy (AOT-HAP).
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The AOT-HAP involves a sender, multiple receivers and an issuer. The sender carries a database
with N messages and generates a ciphertext database. The access policies are embedded in
ciphertexts and are kept veiled. Only those receivers who have the necessary attributes can
decipher the ciphertext using secret key issued by the issuer corresponding to its attribute
set. A receiver decode the message correctly if his attribute set satisfies the access structure
embedded in the ciphertext. Otherwise, a wrong message is retrieved by the receiver. In an
adaptive k-out-of-N oblivious transfer, each receiver can recover only k messages and remains
oblivious to other N − k messages. The term adaptive means, a receiver recovers one message
in each of k transactions. The AOT-HAP consists of three phases – initialization, issue and
transfer. The ciphertext database is generated at initialization phase. In issue phase, the secret
key is generated corresponding to a receiver’s attribute set. Using secret key, a receiver contacts
with the sender to decode the ciphertext in transfer phase. Initialization phase is executed once
at the outset of the protocol. Issue phase is also executed once between the issuer and a receiver.
On the other hand, transfer phase is run k times between a receiver and the sender.
Rabin [28] introduced the first oblivious transfer which was subsequently followed by Bras-
sard et al. [6] and Even et al. [16] to construct secure protocols for multiparty computa-
tion. Tauman [21] proposed an efficient contruction of oblivious transfer protocol using pro-
jective hash framework of Cramer and Shoup [14]. Naor and Pinkas [25] generalized the con-
cept of Tauman. A wide variety of oblivious transfer protocols are available in the literature
[1, 3, 7, 15, 22, 23, 27, 29].
The first AOT was introduced by Naor and Pinkas [24] consequently followed by [11], [17].
Aforementioned AOT do not restrict the receivers to access the content of the database. Coull
et al. [13] presented the first AOT with access policy which was subsequently generalized by
Camenisch et al. [9] and Zhang et al. [31]. Recently, Guleria and Dutta [20] presented the
first issuer-free AOT with access policy in universal composable (UC) framework. However,
the access policies are public in [9], [13], [20] and [31]. To overcome this, Camenisch et al,
[8], [10] and Guleria and Dutta [19] introduced AOT-HAP which are the only oblivious transfer
protocols with hidden access policies. The security framework adapted in [24] is half-simulation
model while that in [11], [17], [13], [9], [31], [8], [10] and [19] is full-simulation model. In the
half-simulation model, the security of one party is examined by comparing the output of the real
world against the turnout of the ideal world, while the security of the other party is examined
by an argument. The full-simulation model addresses the security of the sender and a receiver
in real/ideal world paradigm. None of these models support concurrent execution. Abe et al.
[2] proposed the first UC secure AOT with access policy. The UC secure framework follows
real/ideal world paradigm and also remains secure even when composed with each other or
with the instances of other protocols.
Our Contribution. The aforesaid AOT-HAP protocols do not consider collusion of an issuer
with a collection of receivers. If the issuer colludes with any receiver, the receiver can decipher
the ciphertext database by getting private keys for all the attributes in the universe of attributes,
hence, making these protocols insecure. Besides, the existing AOT-HAP protocols [8], [10], [19]
are secure in full-simulation model which are vulnerable to practical attacks against concurrent
execution. Designs without such constraints are more desirable in practice from both security
and efficiency point of view. In this paper, we concentrate on designing AOT-HAP by eliminating
these limitations. Our contribution in this paper is–
• firstly to contruct an issuer-free AOT-HAP,
• secondly to prove security in UC framework so that it does not loose security when com-
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posed with each other or with other protocols.
Our issuer-free k-out-of-N AOT-HAP is executed between a sender and multiple receivers. We
combine Boneh-Boyen (BB) [4] signature and Nishide et al. [26] ciphertext policy attribute
based encryption (CP-ABE). Groth-Sahai proofs [18] are employed for non-interactive verifi-
cation of pairing product equations. The sender holds a database of N messages, and each
receiver carries some attributes. Each message is associated with an access policy. The sender
generates ciphertext database in initialization phase by encrypting each message using CP-ABE
under its access policy. The ciphertext database is made public, but the access policies are kept
hidden. Subsequently, the protocol makes a motion to issue phase, in which a receiver inter-
acts with the sender to get private key corresponding to its attribute set without leaking any
information about its attributes to the sender. Finally, the receiver invokes transfer phase to
recover the message. The receiver can retrieve at most k messages, one in each transfer phase
in our k-out-of-N AOT-HAP.
The security of our AOT-HAP is analyzed in UC framework in static corruption model in
which, the adversary pre-decides which party to corrupt at the beginning of the protocol. This
allows security against individual malicious receiver as well as malicious sender. The malicious
adversary do not follow the protocol specifications and its malicious behaviour is controlled
by providing non-interactive zero-knowledge [18] proofs. We use Groth-Sahai non-interactive
witness indistinguishability (NIWI) and non-interactive zero-knowledge (NIZK) proofs to detect
the malicious activities of a receiver and the sender, respectively. The proposed AOT-HAP
provides the following security guarantees –
• the sender does not know who queries a message, which message is being queried and
what is the access policy of the message,
• the receiver learns one message per query,
• the receiver recovers the message correctly if its attribute set qualifies the access policy
associated with the message,
• the receiver does not learn anything about the access policy of the message.
The proposed AOT-HAP is UC secure assuming q-strong Diffie-Hellman (SDH), decision Linear
(DLIN) and decision bilinear Diffie-Hellman (DBDH) assumptions in the presence of malicious
adversary.
We compare the proposed AOT-HAP with the existing similar schemes, [8], [10] and [19], which
are the only schemes available in literature. The AOT-HAP [8], [10] and [19] assume an issuer and
are secure in full-simulation model. The AOT scheme of [2] is secure in UC framework. However,
it invokes an issuer and access policies are public. In contrast, our proposed AOT-HAP relaxing
the need of an issuer and is secure in UC framework. In [2], [8], [10] and [19], an issuer is included
to certify whether each of the receiver possesses the claimed attributes. In such protocols, when
a receiver sends an attribute to the ideal functionality, the functionality passes the attribute
and receiver identity to the issuer. The issuer informs the functionality whether the attribute
should be rejected or accepted. In our protocol, when a receiver sends an attribute to the
ideal functionality, the functionality passes the randomized attribute to the sender. The sender
checks whether the randomized attribute satisfies the associated pairing product equation. If
yes, the sender tells the functionality that the attribute should be accepted, otherwise, rejected.
The access policies associated with the messages are completely hidden. The encryption of the
messages is such that only those receivers whose attribute set satisfies the access policy attached
with messages could recover a correct message otherwise a random message is recovered.
3
2 Preliminaries
Notations: Throughout, ρ is taken as the security parameter, x
$
←− A is a random element
sampled from the set A, y ← B indicates algorithm B outputs y, X
c
≈ Y denotes X and Y are
indistinguishable computationally and N denotes natural numbers.
Definition 2.1. (Bilinear Pairing) The map e : G1 × G2 → GT is bilinear if the following
conditions are stisfied. (i) e(xa, yb) = e(x, y)ab ∀ x ∈ G1, y ∈ G2, a, b ∈ Zp. (ii) e(x, y) generates
GT , ∀ x ∈ G1, y ∈ G2, x 6= 1, y 6= 1. (iii) e(x, y) is efficiently computable ∀ x ∈ G1, y ∈ G2,
where G1,G2 and GT are three multiplicative cyclic groups of prime order p and g1 and g2 are
generators of G1 and G2 respectively.
If G1 6= G2, then e is asymmetric bilinear pairing. Otherwise, e is symmetric bilinear pairing.
Definition 2.2. (q-SDH [4]) The advantage Advq−SDH
G
(A) = Pr[A(g, gx, gx
2
, . . . , gx
q
) = (c,
g
1
x+c )] of q-Strong Diffie-Hellman (SDH) assumption is negligible in ρ, where g
$
←− G, x
$
←−
Zp, c ∈ Zp and A is a PPT algorithm with running time in ρ.
Definition 2.3. (DLIN [5]) The advantage AdvDLING (A) = Pr[A(g, g
a, gb, gra, gsb, gr+s)] −
Pr[A(g, ga, gb, gra, gsb, t)] of Decision Linear (DLIN) assumption in is negligible in ρ, where
g
$
←− G, t
$
←− G, a, b, r, s ∈ Zp and A is a PPT algorithm with running time in ρ.
Definition 2.4. (DBDH [30]) The advantage AdvDBDHG,GT (A) = Pr[A(g, g
a, gb, gc, e(g, g)abc)] −
Pr[A(g, ga, gb, gc, Z)] of Decision Bilinear Diffie-Hellman (DBDH) assumption is negligible in
ρ, where g
$
←− G, Z
$
←− GT , a, b, c ∈ Zp and A is a PPT algorithm with running time in ρ.
BilinearSetup: The BilinearSetup on input ρ outputs params = (p,G1,G2,GT , e, g1, g2),
where e : G1 × G2 → GT is an asymmetric bilinear pairing, g1 generates a group G1,
g2 generates a group G2 and p, the order of the groups G1, G2 and GT , is prime, i.e
params← BilinearSetup(1ρ).
2.1 Non-Interactive Verification of Pairing Product Equation [18]
A prover and a verifier runs the Groth-Sahai proofs for non-interactive verification of a pairing
product equation
Q∏
q=1
e(aq
n∏
i=1
x
αq,i
i , bq
n∏
i=1
y
βq,i
i ) = tT , (2.1)
where aq ∈ G1, bq ∈ G2, αq,i, βq,i ∈ Zp and tT ∈ GT , the coefficients of the pairing product
equation 2.1 are given to the verifier, q = 1, 2, . . . , Q, i = 1, 2, . . . , n. The prover knows the
secret values (also called witnesses) xi=1,2,...,n ∈ G1, yi=1,2,...,n ∈ G2 that satisfy the equation
2.1. The prover proves in a non-interactive way that he knows xi and yi without giving any
knowledge about secret values to the verifier. Let W = {xi=1,2,...,n, yi=1,2,...,n} denotes the set
of all secret values equation 2.1. The set W is called witnesses.
For non-interactive verification of the pairing product equation 2.1, a common reference string
GS is generated upon input a security parameter ρ as follows. Let params = (p,G1,G2,GT , e, g1,
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g2) ← BilinearSetup(1
ρ), set u1 = (g
a
1 , 1, g1) ∈ G
3
1, u2 = (1, g
b
1, g1) ∈ G
3
1, u3 = u
ξ1
1 u
ξ2
2 =
(gaξ11 , g
bξ2
1 , g
ξ1+ξ2
1 ) ∈ G
3
1, v1 = (g
a
2 , 1, g2) ∈ G
3
2, v2 = (1, g
b
2, g2) ∈ G
3
2, v3 = v
ξ1
1 v
ξ2
2 = (g
aξ1
2 , g
bξ2
2 ,
gξ1+ξ22 ) ∈ G
3
2, where ξ1, ξ2
$
←− Zp, a, b
$
←− Zp and µ1 : G1 → G
3
1, µ2 : G2 → G
3
2, µT :
GT → G
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T are three efficiently computable embeddings such that µ1(g1) = (1, 1, g1), µ2(g2) =
(1, 1, g2), and µT (tT ) =
 1 1 11 1 1
1 1 tT
∀ g1 ∈ G1, g2 ∈ G2, tT ∈ GT . Note that µT (tT ) ∈ G9T
written in matrix form for convenience. Two elements of G9T are multiplied component wise.
The common reference string GS = (u1, u2, u3, v1, v2, v3) is made public to the prover and the
verifier. The commitments of xi=1,2,...,n and yi=1,2,...,n are generated using GS by the prover. To
commit xi ∈ G1 and yi ∈ G2, the prover takes r1i, r2i, r3i
$
←− Zp and s1i, s2i, s3i
$
←− Zp, sets
ci = Com(xi) = µ1(xi)u
r1i
1 u
r2i
2 u
r3i
3 , di = Com
′(yi) = µ2(yi)vs1i1 v
s2i
2 v
s3i
3 ,
where Com(xi) ∈ G
3
1,Com
′(yi) ∈ G32 for each i = 1, 2, . . . , n. The following proof components
are generated by the prover
Pj =
Q∏
q=1
(
d̂q
)∑n
i=1 αq,irji
, P ′j =
Q∏
q=1
(
µ1(aq)
n∏
i=1
µ1(xi)
αq,i
)∑n
i=1 βq,isji
using random values rji, sji, which were used for generating commitments to xi, yi, and gives
proof π = (c1, c2, . . . , cn, d1, d2, . . . , dn, P1, P2, P3, P
′
1, P
′
2, P
′
3) to the verifier, where
d̂q = µ2(bq)
n∏
i=1
d
βq,i
i , 1 ≤ i ≤ n, j = 1, 2, 3.
The verifier computes
ĉq = µ1(aq)
n∏
i=1
c
αq,i
i , d̂q = µ2(bq)
n∏
i=1
d
βq,i
i ,
using ci, di, coefficients αq,i, βq,i and outputs VALID if the following equation holds
Q∏
q=1
F (ĉq, d̂q) = µT (tT )
3∏
j=1
F (uj , Pj)F (P
′
j , vj), (2.2)
where F : G31 ×G
3
2 → G
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T is defined as
F ((x1, x2, x3), (y1, y2, y3)) =
 e(x1, y1) e(x1, y2) e(x1, y3)e(x2, y1) e(x2, y2) e(x2, y3)
e(x3, y1) e(x3, y2) e(x3, y3)
 .
The equations 2.2 and 2.1 holds simultaneously. For a linear equation in which yi are secrets,
the verifier verifies the following equation
Q∏
q=1
F
(
µ1(aq)
n∏
i=1
µ1(xi)
αq,i , d̂q
)
= µT (tT )
3∏
j=1
F (P ′j , vj), (2.3)
where P ′j =
Q∏
q=1
(
µ1(aq)
n∏
i=1
µ1(xi)
αq,i
)∑n
i=1 βq,isji
, j = 1, 2, 3. (2.4)
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If xi are secrets, the verifier has to verify the following equation
Q∏
q=1
F
(
ĉq, µ2(bq)
n∏
i=1
µ2(yi)
βq,i
)
= µT (tT )
3∏
j=1
F (uj , Pj), (2.5)
where Pj =
Q∏
q=1
(
µ2(bq)
n∏
i=1
µ2(yi)
βq,i
)∑n
i=1 αq,irji
, j = 1, 2, 3. (2.6)
Theorem 2.5. [18] The common reference strings in perfectly sound setting and witness indis-
tinguishability setting under DLIN assumption are computationally indistinguishable .
Definition 2.6. (NIWI) The advantage
AdvNIWIG,GT (A) = Pr [A(GS,S,W0) = π]− Pr [A(GS,S,W1) = π]
of non-interactive witness- indistinguishable (NIWI) proof is negligible in ρ under DLIN assump-
tion, where GS denotes perfectly sound setting’s common reference string, S is a pairing product
equation, W0,W1 denote two different set of witnesses satisfying equation S, π denotes proof
for equation S and A is a PPT algorithm with running time in ρ.
Definition 2.7. (NIZK) The advantage
AdvNIZKG,GT (A) = Pr[A(GS
′,S,W) = π0]− Pr[A(GS′,S, tsim) = π1]
of non-interactive zero-knowledge (NIZK) proof is negligible in ρ under DLIN assumption, where
GS′ denotes witness indistinguishability setting’s common reference string, S is a pairing product
equation, W denotes witnesses satisfying pairing equation S, π0 denotes proof for equation S,
π1 denotes simulated proof for equation S and A is a PPT algorithm with running time in ρ.
Theorem 2.8. [18] Under DLIN assumption, the Groth-Sahai proofs are composable NIWI and
NIZK for satisfiability of a set of pairing product equation under a bilinear group .
2.2 Access Structure for Ciphertext [26]
Let n be the total number of attributes, and the attributes are indexed as {A1,A2, . . . ,An}. Each
attribute Aℓ can take nℓ values, where ℓ = 1, 2, . . . , n. Let Sℓ = {vℓ,1, vℓ,2, . . . , vℓ,t, . . . , vℓ,nℓ}
be the set of possible values for Aℓ. The notation L = [L1, L2, . . . , Ln] is used to denote
attribute list or attribute set for a receiver R, where Lℓ ∈ Sℓ. Each receiver has exactly one
attribute value from each Sℓ, ℓ = 1, 2, . . . , n. The notation W = [W1,W2, . . . ,Wn] is used
to specify the access policy associated with a message, where Wℓ ⊆ Sℓ. The attribute list
L satisfies W if and only if Lℓ ∈ Wℓ, for ℓ = 1, 2, . . . , n. The notation L |= W is used
to denote L satisfies W . For instance, let n = 3 and m′ be a message with access policy
W = [W1 = {v1,1, v1,3},W2 = {v2,2},W3 = {v3,1, v3,2, v3,3}]. Consider two attribute lists
L = [v1,1, v2,2, v3,1], L˜ = [v1,2, v2,2, v3,3]. The attribute list L |=W , but L˜ does not satisfy W as
v1,2 /∈W1.
3 Security Model
3.1 Syntactic of AOT-HAP
The adaptive oblivious transfer with hidden access policy (AOT-HAP) is a tuple of PPT algo-
rithms and interactive protocols, AOT-HAP = (CRSSetup,DBSetup, Issue,Transfer) between a
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sender and multiple receivers.
– CrsSetup: This randomized algorithm generates common reference string crs which is made
public for everyone.
– DBsetup: This randomized algorithm is run by the sender S who holds a database DB =
{mi,Wi}1≤i≤N of N messages. Each message mi is associated with access policy Wi =
[Wi,1,Wi,2, . . . ,Wi,n], where Wi,ℓ ⊆ Sℓ, i = 1, 2, . . . , N, ℓ = 1, 2, . . . , n. The algorithm
generates public/secret key pair (pk, sk), encrypts each mi under access policy Wi and
generates ciphertext φi. The access policyWi is embedded implicitly in φi. The algorithm
outputs (pk, sk, ψ, cDB) to S. The proof ψ guarantees that (pk, sk) is a valid public/secret
key pair. The sender S publishes public key pk, proof ψ and cihertext database cDB =
{φi}1≤i≤N to all the receivers. The secret key sk and access policies {Wi}1≤i≤N are kept
hidden.
– Issue Protocol: A receiver R with attributes list L = [L1, L2, . . . , Ln], Lℓ ∈ Sℓ, engages in
Issue protocol with S to get attribute secret key ASK from S, where ℓ = 1, 2, . . . , n. At
the end, R gets ASK without leaking any information about its attribute list L to S.
– Transfer Protocol: The receiver R invokes transfer protocol with S to decrypt the ciphertext
φσj , where σj ∈ {1, 2, . . . , N}, j = 1, 2, . . . , k. The receiver R recovers the message mσj if
its attribute list L satisfies the access policy Wσj associated with mσj , otherwise, R gets
some random message.
3.2 UC Framework
The universal composable (UC) framework was presented by Canetti [12] is adapted in this
paper. It includes two worlds– (i) real world and (ii) ideal world. The members involved in
real world are M receivers R1, R2, . . . , RM , a sender S, an adversary A and an environment
machine Z. The environment machine Z starts the protocol execution Π by giving inputs to
all the parties. In real protocol execution Π, parties interact with each other and A. Respective
outputs are given Z by all the parties. Finally, Z outputs a bit, which is output of real
world. Ideal world includes an additional incorruptible trusted party FN×1AOT-HAP, called an ideal
functionality. In ideal world, parties are dummy parties, S˜, R˜1, R˜2, . . . , R˜M . Dummy parties do
not communicate with each other. Activated dummy party just forwards its input to FN×1AOT-HAP
which is instructed to do the computation work. The ideal functionality FN×1AOT-HAP gives outputs
to the dummy parties. At the end, Z outputs a bit, which is output of ideal world. Now, a
protocol Π is said to be securely realizes an ideal functionality FN×1AOT-HAP if Z is unable to
distinguish its interaction with non-negligible probability between a real world adversary A
and parties S,R1, R2, . . . , RM running the protocol Π in the real world A and an ideal world
adversary A′ and FN×1AOT-HAP, interacting with S˜, R˜1, R˜2, . . . , R˜M , in the ideal world.
Definition 3.1. A protocol Π securely realizes the ideal functionality FN×1AOT-HAP if for any A,
there exists A′ such that for any Z,
IDEALFN×1
AOT-HAP,A′,Z
c
≈ REALΠ,A,Z ,
where IDEALFN×1
AOT-HAP,A′,Z
and REALΠ,A,Z are ideal world and real world outputs respectively.
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FDCRS Hybrid Model: As ideal functionalities can be UC-realized only in the presence of some
trusted setup. One common form of setup is common reference string (CRS). Let us describe the
FDCRS-hybrid model [12] that UC realizes a protocol parameterized by some specific distribution
D. Upon receiving a message (CRS), from any party, FDCRS first checks if there is a recorded
value crs. If not, FDCRS generates crs← D(1
ρ) and records it. Finally, FDCRS sends crs to the party
and the adversary. In the proposed construction, the distribution D is CrsSetup algorithm, i.e,
crs ← CrsSetup(1ρ). The algorithm outputs crs and is made public. Let us briefly discuss how
the parties interacts in the real world and in the ideal world. We discuss an interaction between
the sender S and a receiver R.
Real World: Upon receiving messages (initdb,DB = {mi,Wi}1≤i≤N ), (issue, L) and (transfer, σj)
from Z, how S and R behave are briefly discussed below, where j = 1, 2, . . . , k.
• The sender S upon receiving a message (initdb,DB = {mi,Wi}1≤i≤N ) runs DBSetup algo-
rithm with input crs and DB. In DB = {mi,Wi}1≤i≤N , each mi is associated with access
policy Wi. The algorithm outputs public/secret key pair (pk, sk), a proof ψ which shows
the validity of public/secret key pair and ciphertext database cDB = {φi}1≤i≤N . The
access policy Wi is embedded implicitly in φi. The sender S publishes pk, ψ, cDB to all
parties and keeps sk, {Wi}1≤i≤N secret to itself.
• The receiver R upon receiving a message (issue, L) from Z engages in Issue protocol with
S. The receiver R first randomizes its attribute set L and generates randomized attributes
set L′. The sender S upon receiving L′ from R, generates randomized attribute secret key
ASK′ and gives ASK′ to R. The receiver R extracts ASK from ASK′ using random values
which were used to randomize the set L.
• Upon receiving a message (transfer, σj) from Z, R invokes Transfer protocol. The receiver
R takes ciphertext φσj from cDB and generates Reqσj ,Priσj , πσj . The request Reqσj is the
randomization of φσj and is given to S. The proof πσj convinces S that R is decrypting
a valid ciphertext φσj ∈ cDB. The receiver R gives Reqσj , πσj to S and keeps Priσj secret
to itself. The sender S generates response Resσj using secret key sk. The response Resσj
and proof δσj is given to R by S. The proof δσj convinces R that S has used the same
secret key sk which was used in generating cDB. Using Resσj , R correctly decrypts φσj
and recovers mσj if R’s attribute set L implicitly satisfies Wσj . Otherwise, R obtains a
random message.
Ideal World: Upon receiving messages (initdb,DB = {mi,Wi}1≤i≤N ), (issue, L) and (transfer, σj)
from Z, the dummy parties forward them to the ideal functionality FN×1AOT-HAP. The ideal func-
tionality FN×1AOT-HAP keeps an empty database DB and an empty attribute set LR for each receiver
R. Let us briefly discuss the actions of FN×1AOT-HAP.
• Upon receiving message (initdb,DB = {mi,Wi}1≤i≤N ) from S, FN×1AOT-HAP updates DB =
{mi,Wi}1≤i≤N .
• The ideal functionality FN×1AOT-HAP upon receiving message (issue, L) from R, sends (issue)
to S and receives a bit b ∈ {0, 1} in return from S. If b = 1, FN×1AOT-HAP updates LR = L.
Otherwise, FN×1AOT-HAP does nothing.
• Upon receiving message (transfer, σj) from R, F
N×1
AOT-HAP sends (transfer) to S, who in turn
returns a bit b ∈ {0, 1}. If b = 1, FN×1AOT-HAP checks whether σj ∈ {1, 2, . . . , N} and LR
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satisfies Wσj . If yes, F
N×1
AOT-HAP gives mσj to R. Otherwise, F
N×1
AOT-HAP sends a null string
⊥ to R.
4 Protocol
Our AOT-HAP = (CRSSetup,DBSetup, Issue,Transfer) couples Boneh-Boyen (BB) signature [4]
and ciphertext policy attribute based encryption (CP-ABE) of Nishide et al. [26]. In addi-
tion, Groth-Sahai [18] proofs for non-interactive verification of pairing product equations are
employed. The AOT-HAP involves a sender and multiple receivers. We consider an interaction
between a sender S with a database DB = {mi,Wi}1≤i≤N and a receiver R with attribute
list L = [v1,t1 , v2,t2 , . . . , vn,tn ]. As a protocol can be universal composable (UC) realized only
under some trusted setup assumptions, algorithm CRSSetup is invoked to generate a common
reference string crs which is made public to all parties. In initialization phase, S executes algo-
rithm DBSetup. The sender S holds a database DB = {mi,Wi}1≤i≤N , where Wi is the access
policy associated with mi, 1 ≤ i ≤ N . Each message mi is encrypted to generate ciphertext
φi using CP-ABE of [26] under Wi. The access policy Wi is embedded implicitly in φi and
is not made public. The BB signature is used to sign the random value which was used to
encrypt mi. In Issue phase, the receiver R with the attribute list L interacts with S to get
attribute secret key ASK. To decrypt the ciphertext φσj , R engages in Transfer protocol with
S and extracts mσj if L |= Wσj , otherwise, R gets a random message. Formal description
of CRSSetup,DBSetup, Issue,Transfer are given below. Let A1,A2, . . . ,An be n attributes and
each attribute Aℓ can take nℓ values, namely, {vℓ,1, vℓ,2, . . . , vℓ,nℓ} as explained in section 2.2,
ℓ = 1, 2, . . . , n.
Algorithm 1 CrsSetup
Input: ρ, n, n1, n2, . . . , nn.
Output: crs.
1: Generate Assparams← AssBilinearSetup(1ρ);
2: for (ℓ = 0, 1, . . . , n) do
3: for (t = 0, 1, . . . , nℓ) do
4: Choose aℓ,t
$
←− Zp;
5: Set Aℓ,t = g
aℓ,t
1 , Bℓ,t = g
aℓ,t
2 ;
6: Take ξ1, ξ2, a˜, b˜, ξ̂1, ξ̂2, â, b̂
$
←− Zp;
7: Set u1 = (g
a˜
1 , 1, g1), u2 = (1, g
b˜
1, g1), u3 = u
ξ1
1 u
ξ2
2 = (g
a˜ξ1
1 , g
b˜ξ2
1 , g
ξ1+ξ2
1 );
8: Set v1 = (g
a˜
2 , 1, g2), v2 = (1, g
b˜
2, g2), v3 = v
ξ1
1 v
ξ2
2 = (g
a˜ξ1
2 , g
b˜ξ2
2 , g
ξ1+ξ2
2 );
9: û1 = (g
â
1 , 1, g1), û2 = (1, g
b̂
1, g1), û3 = û
ξ̂1
1 û
ξ̂2
2 = (g
âξ̂1
1 , g
b̂ξ̂2
1 , g
ξ̂1+ξ̂2
1 );
10: v̂1 = (g
â
2 , 1, g2), v̂2 = (1, g
b̂
2, g2), v̂3 = v̂
ξ̂1
1 v̂
ξ̂2
2 = (g
âξ̂1
2 , g
b̂ξ̂2
2 , g
ξ̂1+ξ̂2
2 );
11: GSS = (u1, u2, u3, v1, v2, v3),GSR = (û1, û2, û3, v̂1, v̂2, v̂3);
12: crs = (Assparams,GSS ,GSR, {Aℓ,t, Bℓ,t}1≤t≤nℓ,1≤ℓ≤n);
– CrsSetup(1ρ). The algorithm generates common reference string crs on input security pa-
rameter ρ, number of attributes n, number of values nℓ that each attribute Aℓ can take. The
algorithm generates bilinear pairing groups by invoking algorithm BilinearSetup given in sec-
tion 2. For each attribute value vℓ,t, the algorithm picks aℓ,t randomly from Zp, sets Aℓ,t =
g
aℓ,t
1 , Bℓ,t = g
aℓ,t
2 , for t = 1, 2, . . . , nℓ, ℓ = 1, 2, . . . , n. The algorithm generates the Groth-Sahai
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common reference strings GSS = (u1, u2, u3, v1, v2, v3) for S and GSR = (û1, û2, û3, v̂1, v̂2, v̂3)
for R in perfectly sound setting by choosing ξ1, ξ2, a˜, b˜, ξ̂1, ξ̂2, â, b̂ randomly from Zp and setting
u1 = (g
a˜
1 , 1, g1), u2 = (1, g
b˜
1, g1), u3 = (g
a˜ξ1
1 , g
b˜ξ2
1 , g
ξ1+ξ2
1 ), v1 = (g
a˜
2 , 1, g2), v2 = (1, g
b˜
2, g2), v3 =
(ga˜ξ12 , g
b˜ξ2
2 , g
ξ1+ξ2
2 ), û1 = (g
â
1 , 1, g1), û2 = (1, g
b̂
1, g1), û3 = (g
âξ̂1
1 , g
b̂ξ̂2
1 , g
ξ̂1+ξ̂2
1 ), v̂1 = (g
â
2 , 1, g2), v̂2 =
(1, gb̂2, g2), v̂3 = (g
âξ̂1
2 , g
b̂ξ̂2
2 , g
ξ̂1+ξ̂2
2 ). It outputs crs = (params,GSS ,GSR, {{Aℓ,t, Bℓ,t}1≤t≤nℓ}1≤ℓ≤n)
to all parties.
Algorithm 2 DBSetup
Input: crs,DB = {(mi,Wi)}1≤i≤N .
Output: pk, sk, ψ, cDB = {φi}1≤i≤N .
1: Randomly choose w, x, α, β, γ
$
←− Zp;
2: Compute B = gβ1 , y = g
x
1 , h = g
γ
2 , Y = e(g1, g
w
2 ), H = e(B,h), B
γ , gw1 , g
α
1 , g
α
2 ;
3: Generate Com′(h) using GSR;
4: Set public key pk = (B, y, Y,H, Com′(h));
5: Set secret key sk = (x, α, β, γ, w, h,Bγ , gw1 , g
w
2 , g
α
1 , g
α
2 );
6: The proof ψ = NIZKGSS{(B
γ , gw1 , g
w
2 , h, g
α
1 , g
α
2 , g
′) | e(g−11 , g
w
2 )e(g
w
1 , g
′) = 1 ∧
e(B−1, h)e(Bγ , g′) = 1 ∧ e(g−11 , g
α
2 )e(g
α
1 , g
′) = 1 ∧ e(g1, g′) = e(g1, g2)};
7: for (i = 1, 2, . . . , N) do
8: si,1, si,2, . . . , si,n
$
←− Zp;
9: Set ri = si,1 + si,2 + . . . + si,n;
10: c
(1)
i = g
1
x+ri
2 ;
11: c
(2)
i = B
ri ;
12: c
(3)
i = mi · Y
ri · e(c
(2)
i , h);
13: for (ℓ = 1, 2, . . . , n) do
14: c
(4)
i,ℓ = g
si,ℓ
1
15: for (t = 1, 2, . . . , nℓ) do
16: if (vℓ,t ∈Wi,ℓ) then
17: c
(5)
i,ℓ,t = A
αsi,ℓ
ℓ,t , where Aℓ,t is extracted from crs;
18: else
19: c
(5)
i,ℓ,t = g
zi,ℓ,t
1 , zi,ℓ,t
$
←− Zp;
20: Set c
(4)
i = {c
(4)
i,ℓ }1≤ℓ≤n, c
(5)
i = {{c
(5)
i,ℓ,t}1≤t≤nℓ}1≤ℓ≤n;
21: φi = (c
(1)
i , c
(2)
i , c
(3)
i , c
(4)
i , c
(5)
i );
22: cDB = (φ1, φ2, . . . , φN );
– DBSetup(crs,DB = {(mi,Wi)}1≤i≤N ). This algorithm is executed by S with input crs,
database DB = {(mi, Wi)}1≤i≤N , where mi ∈ GT , Wi = [Wi,1,Wi,2, . . . ,Wi,n] is the ac-
cess policy associated with mi, Wi,ℓ ⊆ Sℓ as discussed in section 2.2, i = 1, 2, . . . , N , ℓ =
1, 2, . . . , n. The algorithm randomly takes w, x, α, β, γ from Zp, computes B = g
β
1 , y = g
x
1 , h =
gγ2 , Y = e(g1, g
w
2 ),H = e(B,h), B
γ , gw1 , g
α
1 , g
α
2 . Additionally, it computes Com
′(h) using GSR
as in section 2.1. The algorithm sets public key pk = (B, y, Y,H, Com′(h)), secret key sk =
(x, α, β, γ, w, h,Bγ , gw1 , g
w
2 , g
α
1 , g
α
2 ). The proof
ψ = NIZKGSS{(B
γ , gw1 , g
w
2 , h, g
α
1 , g
α
2 , g
′) | e(g−11 , g
w
2 )e(g
w
1 , g
′) = 1 ∧ e(B−1, h)e(Bγ , g′) = 1∧
(g−11 , g
α
2 )e(g
α
1 , g
′) = 1 ∧ e(g1, g′) = e(g1, g2)}
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20: Set
(4) (4)
i,ℓ , c
(5)
{{
(5)
i,ℓ,t
21: = (
(1)
, c
(2)
, c
(3)
, c
(4)
, c
(5)
);
22: cDB = ( , φ , . . . , φ );
In ciphertext = (
(1)
, c
(2)
, c
(3)
, c
(4)
, c
(5)
),
(1)
is the signature on
(2)
, c
(3)
, c
(4)
, c
(5)
is the CP-ABE of = 1 , . . . , N . The algorithm outputs pk sk, ψ and ciphertext database
cDB to . The sender publishes pk, ψ, cDB to all parties and keeps
sk hidden. Anyone can verify the correctness of cDB = (
(1)
, c
(2)
, c
(3)
, c
(4)
{
(4)
i,ℓ } ≤ ≤ , c
(5)
) by verifying the equation
(∏
=1
(4)
i,ℓ · y, c
(1)
)
, g ) for each = 1 , . . . , N.
Receiver R(crs, L = [v1,t1 , v2,t2 , . . . , vn,tn ]) Sender S(crs, sk)
For ℓ = 1 to n
zℓ
$
←− Zp
Rℓ = Bℓ,tℓ · g
zℓ
2 , Tℓ = g
zℓ
1
Set L′ = {R1, R2, . . . , Rn}
ϕ = NIWIGSR{({Aℓ,tℓ , Tℓ}1≤ℓ≤n) |
e(g1,
∏n
ℓ=1Rℓ) = e(
∏n
ℓ=1Aℓ,t, g2)e(
∏n
ℓ=1 Tℓ, g2)}
L′, ϕ
−−−→
If proof ϕ hold, then
s, λ1, λ2, . . . , λn
$
←− Zp
d0 = g
w+s
β
2
d′ℓ,1 = g
s
2 ·R
λℓ
ℓ ∀ 1 ≤ ℓ ≤ n
dℓ,2 = g
λℓ
2 ∀ 1 ≤ ℓ ≤ n
dℓ,3 = g
λℓ
α
2 ∀ 1 ≤ ℓ ≤ n
ASK′ = (d0, {d
′
ℓ,1, dℓ,2, dℓ,3}1≤ℓ≤n)
ASK′
←−−−
d0 = d0, dℓ,1 =
d′
ℓ,1
d
zℓ
ℓ,2
, dℓ,2 = dℓ,2, dℓ,3 = dℓ,3 ∀ ℓ, 1 ≤ ℓ ≤ n
Check if
e(g1,dℓ,1)·Y
e(B,d0)
= e(Aℓ,tℓ , dℓ,2) ∀ ℓ, 1 ≤ ℓ ≤ n
ASK = (d0, {dℓ,1, dℓ,2, dℓ,3}1≤ℓ≤n)
Figure 1 Issue Phase.
Issue Protocol crs, L, sk The receiver invokes Issue protocol, given in Figure , to ob-
tain attribute secret key ASK for its attributes list = [ ,t , v ,t , . . . , vn,t ], where ℓ,t
, ℓ = 1 , . . . , n as given in section 2.2. To achieve this, randomizes ℓ,t , extracted from
crs = (params GS GS {{ ℓ,t, Bℓ,t ), corresponding to each ℓ,t from using
random value and generates randomized set as shown in Figure , where = 1 , . . . , n
= 1 , . . . , n. The receiver sets proof NIWIGS ℓ,t =1 ) =
=1 ℓ,t =1 , g to convince that is the randomization of . The random-
ized set and proof is given to . If the proof is valid, uses secret w,α, β from its secret
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Figure 1 Issue Phase.
is generated to convinc R that S knows secr ts gw2 , g
α
2 , h. The proof ψ consists of proof
components of equations e(g−11 , g
w
2 )e(g
w
1 , g
′) = 1 ∧ e(B−1, h)e(Bγ , g′) = 1 ∧ (g−11 , g
α
2 )e(g
α
1 , g
′) =
1 ∧ e(g1, g
′) = e(g1, g2) and commitments of witnesses Bγ , gw1 , g
w
2 , h, g
α
1 , g
α
2 , g
′ generated using
GSS as explained in section 2.1. To encrypt mi under Wi, random values si,1, si,2, . . . , si,n are
selected from Zp. The algorithm sets ri = si,1+ i,2+ . . .+ i,n and signs i using Boneh-Boyen
(BB) signature [4] as shown in line 10 of Algorithm 2. After that, mi is encrypted using CP-ABE
of [26].
In ciphertext φi = (c
(1)
i , c
(2)
i , c
(3)
i , c
(4)
i , c
(5)
i ), c
(1)
i = g
1
x+ri
2 is the signature on ri, c
(2)
i , c
(3)
i , c
(4)
i , c
(5)
i
is the CP-ABE of mi, i = 1, 2, . . . , N . The algorithm outputs pk, sk, ψ and ciphertext database
cDB = {φi}1≤i≤N to S. The sender S publishes pk, ψ, cDB = {φi}1≤i≤N to all parties and keeps
sk hidden.
Correctness of cDB: Anyone can verify the correctness of cDB = {φi}1≤i≤N , φi = (c
(1)
i , c
(2)
i , c
(3)
i ,
c
(4)
i = {c
(4)
i,ℓ }1≤ℓ≤n, c
(5)
i ) by verifying the following equations
e
(
n∏
ℓ=1
c
(4)
i,ℓ · y, c
(1)
i
)
= e(g1, g2) ∀ i = 1, 2, . . . , N.
– Issue Protocol(crs, L, sk). The receiver R invokes Issue protocol, given in Figure 1, to ob-
tain attribute secret key ASK for its attributes list L = [v1,t1 , v2,t2 , . . . , vn,tn ], where vℓ,tℓ ∈
Sℓ, ℓ = 1, 2, . . . , n as given in section 2.2. To achieve this, R randomizes Bℓ,tℓ , extracted from
crs = (params,GSS , GSR, {{Aℓ,t, Bℓ,t}1≤t≤nℓ}1≤ℓ≤n), corresponding to each vℓ,tℓ from L using
random value zℓ and generates randomized set L
′ as shown in Figure 1, where tℓ = 1, 2, . . . , nℓ,
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=1
(4)
,ℓ y, c
(1)
, g ) in guarantees that is a valid ciphertext, i.e,
cDB, and 2nd equation shows that Req is the randomization of
(2)
. The receiver also raises
power to Com ) which was given by in initialization phase generated using GS . This
extra component does not give any advantage to adversary and is useful only for simulator dur-
ing security analysis. The sender checks the validity of . If invalid, outputs a null string
. Otherwise, uses secret h, γ from secret key sk = (x, β, γ, w, h, g ) to compute response
Res Req , h). The proof
NIZKGS h,Req , g Req , h Req , g ) = 1 B, h , g ) = 1 , g ) = , g
is generated to guarantee that has used the same secrets h, γ which were used in initialization
phase to set ciphertext database cDB. Upon receiving Res , δ first verifies . If fails,
outputs a null string . Otherwise, sets
(5)
,ℓ
(5)
,ℓ,t if ℓ,t for = 1 , . . . , n and
computes
(3)
=1
(4)
,ℓ, dℓ,
(2)
, d ·
∏
=1 ˜(5),ℓ, dℓ, · Res
(4.1)
Receiver R(crs,ASK, σj , φσj , pk) Sender S(crs, sk)
vσj
$
←− Zp
Reqσj = c
(2)
σj ·B
vσj = Brσj+vσj
Priσj = H
vσj
πσj = NIWIGSR{(c
(1)
σj ,
∏n
ℓ=1 c
(4)
σj ,ℓ
, g
vσj
2 , c
(2)
σj ) |
e
(∏n
ℓ=1 c
(4)
σj ,ℓ
· y, c
(1)
σj
)
= e(g1, g2)∧
e(Reqσj , g2) = e(c
(2)
σj , g2)e(B, g
vσj
2 )}
Reqσj
,πσj ,(Com
′(h))
vσj
−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−→
If proof πσj hold, then
Resσj = e(Reqσj , h)
δσj = NIZKGSS{(h,Req
γ
σj
, Bγ , g′) |
e(Req−1σj , h)e(Req
γ
σj
, g′) = 1∧
e(B−1, h)e(Bγ , g′) = 1∧
e(g1, g
′) = e(g1, g2)}
Resσj ,δσj
←−−−−−−
If proof δσj hold, then
c
(3)
σj
·
∏n
ℓ=1 e(c
(4)
σj,ℓ
,dℓ,1)·H
vσj
e(c
(2)
σj
,d0)·
∏n
ℓ=1 e(c˜
(5)
σj,ℓ
,dℓ,3)·Resσj
= mσj
Figure 2 Transfer Phase.
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Figure 2 Transfer Phase.
ℓ = 1, 2, . . . , n. The receiver R sets proof ϕ = NIWIGSR{({Aℓ,tℓ , Tℓ}1≤ℓ≤n) | e(g1,
∏n
ℓ=1Rℓ) =
e(
∏n
ℓ=1Aℓ,t, g2)e(
∏n
ℓ=1 Tℓ, g2)} to convince R that L
′ is the randomization of L. The random-
ized set L′ and proof ϕ is given to S. If the proof ϕ is valid, S uses secret w,α, β from its secret
key sk = (x, α, β, γ, w, h,Bγ , gw1 , g
w
2 , g
α
1 , g
α
2 ) to generate d0 = g
w+s
β
2 , d
′
ℓ,1 = g
s
2 · R
λℓ
ℓ , dℓ,2 = g
λℓ
2 ,
dℓ,3 = g
λℓ
α
2 , where s, λℓ are random values from Zp, ℓ = 1, 2, . . . , n. The randomized attribute
secret key ASK′ = (d0, {d′ℓ,1, dℓ,2, dℓ,3}1≤ℓ≤n) is given to R. The receiver R extracts ASK from
ASK′ using random values z1, z2, . . . , zn which were used by R to randomize L and checks the
correctness of ASK by verifying the equation
e(g1, dℓ,1) · Y
e(B, d0)
= e(Aℓ,tℓ , dℓ,2) ∀ ℓ, 1 ≤ ℓ ≤ n.
– Transfer Protocol(crs,ASK, pk, sk, σj , φσj ). The receiver R engages in Transfer protocol with
S to decrypt the ciphertext φσj = (c
(1)
σj , c
(2)
σj , c
(3)
σj , c
(4)
σj , c
(5)
σj ) as shown in Figure 2. For this, R ran-
domizes c
(2)
σj = B
rσj using random value vσj from Zp and generates request Reqσj = c
(2)
σj ·B
vσj =
Brσj+vσj , private Priσj = H
vσj and sets proof πσj = NIWIGSR{(c
(1)
σj ,
∏n
ℓ=1 c
(4)
σj ,ℓ
, g
vσj
2 , c
(2)
σj ) |
e
(∏n
ℓ=1 c
(4)
σj ,ℓ
· y, c
(1)
σj
)
= e(g1, g2) ∧ e(Reqσj , g2) = e(c
(2)
σj , g2)e(B, g
vσj
2 )}. The first equation
e(
∏n
ℓ=1 c
(4)
σj ,ℓ
·y, c
(1)
σj ) = e(g1, g2) in πσj guarantees S that φσj is a valid ciphertext, i.e, φσj ∈ cDB,
and 2nd equation shows that Reqσj is the randomization of c
(2)
σj . The receiver also raises power
vσj to Com
′(h) which was given by S in initialization phase generated using GSR. This extra
component does not give any advantage to adversary and is useful only for simulator during
security analysis. The sender S checks the validity of πσj . If invalid, S outputs a null string ⊥.
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Otherwise, S uses secret h, γ from secret key sk = (x, α, β, γ, w, h,Bγ , gw1 , g
w
2 , g
α
1 , g
α
2 ) to compute
response Resσj = e(Reqσj , h). The proof δσj = NIZKGSS{(h,Req
γ
σj
, Bγ , g′) | e(Req−1σj , h)e(Req
γ
σj
,
g′) = 1 ∧ e(B−1, h)e(Bγ , g′) = 1 ∧ e(g1, g′) = e(g1, g2)} is generated to guarantee R that S has
used the same secrets h, γ which were used in initialization phase to set ciphertext database cDB.
Upon receiving Resσj , δσj , R first verifies δσj . If fails, R outputs a null string ⊥. Otherwise, R
sets c˜
(5)
σj ,ℓ
= c
(5)
σj ,ℓ,tℓ
if vℓ,tℓ ∈ L for ℓ = 1, 2, . . . , n and computes
c
(3)
σj ·
∏n
ℓ=1 e(c
(4)
σj ,ℓ
, dℓ,1) ·H
vσj
e(c
(2)
σj , d0) ·
∏n
ℓ=1 e(c˜
(5)
σj ,ℓ
, dℓ,3) · Resσj
= mσj . (4.1)
Correctness of equation 4.1.
val1 =
n∏
ℓ=1
e(c
(4)
σj ,ℓ
, dℓ,1) =
n∏
ℓ=1
e(g
sσj ,ℓ
1 , g
s
2 ·B
λℓ
ℓ,tℓ
)
=
n∏
ℓ=1
e(g
sσj ,ℓ
1 , g
s+aℓ,tℓλℓ
2 )
= e(g1, g2)
s
∑n
ℓ=1 sσj,ℓe(g1, g2)
∑n
ℓ=1 sσj,ℓaℓ,tℓλℓ
= e(g1, g2)
srσj e(g1, g2)
∑n
ℓ=1 sσj,ℓaℓ,tℓλℓ as
n∑
ℓ=1
sσj ,ℓ = rσj
val2 =
n∏
ℓ=1
e(c˜
(5)
σj ,ℓ
, dℓ,3)
=
n∏
ℓ=1
e(A
αsσj ,ℓ
ℓ,tℓ
, g
λℓ
α
2 ) =
n∏
ℓ=1
e(g
aℓ,tℓsσj,ℓ
1 , g
λℓ
2 )
= e(g1, g2)
∑n
ℓ=1 sσj,ℓaℓ,tℓλℓ
val1
e(c
(2)
σj , d0)val2
=
e(g1, g2)
srσj
e(g1, g2)
rσj (w+s)
=
1
e(g1, g2)
rσjw
=
1
Y rσj
c
(3)
σj · val1 ·H
vσj
e(c
(2)
σj , d0) · val2 · Resσj
=
mσjY
rσj e(B,h)rσjHvσj
Y rσj e(B,h)
rσj+vσj
= mσj ,
where c
(3)
σj = mσj · Y
rσj · e(B,h)rσj ,H = e(B,h), Resσj = e(B,h)
rσj+vσj .
Theorem 4.1. The adaptive oblivious transfer with hidden access policy (AOT-HAP) presented
in section 4 securely realizes the ideal functionality FN×1AOT-HAP in the F
D
CRS-hybrid model described
in section 3 under DLIN, DBDH and q-SDH assumptions.
Proof. The AOT-HAP is run between a sender S and multiple receivers. We simulate an inter-
action between S and a receiver R with an attribute list L = [L1, L2, . . . , Ln], Lℓ ∈ Sℓ, n is the
total number of attributes, ℓ = 1, 2, . . . , n, (see section 2.2 for detail definition of Lℓ, Sℓ). The
adversarial model adapted in this paper is static corruption model in which adversary decides
which party to corrupt before the protocol starts. The corrupted parties remain corrupt, and
honest parties remain honest throughout. Therefore, the case of malicious sender and malicious
receiver are addressed separately. In both cases, an ideal world adversary A′ corresponding to
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a real world adversary A is constructed such that no environment machine or distinguisher Z
can distinguish with non-negligible probability, its interactions with A and parties running the
protocol Π in the real world from its interaction with A′ and ideal functionality FN×1AOT-HAP in the
ideal world. The protocol Π is said to be secure if the real world is as secure as the ideal world.
Since the ideal world consists of incorruptible trusted parties, it is impossible for an adversary to
attack the ideal world. Therefore, all adversarial attack must fail in real world too. Technically,
for each case we show IDEALFN×1
AOT-HAP,A′,Z
c
≈ REALΠ,A,Z , where IDEALFN×1
AOT-HAP,A′,Z
,REALΠ,A,Z
are as defined in section 3.2.
The security proof is presented using sequence of hybrid games. Let Pr[Game i] be the probability
that Z distinguishes the transcript of Game i from the real execution.
(a) Security Against Malicious Receiver R. In this case, the real world adversary A
corrupts the receiver R before the execution of the protocol. The ideal world adversary A′
simulates the honest sender S by invoking a copy of A as follows.
Game 0: This game corresponds to the real world protocol interaction in which the receiver
interacts with the honest sender S. So, Pr[Game 0] = 0.
Game 1: This game is the same as Game 0 except that A′ simulates crs. The adversary A′
simulates crs = (params,GSS , GSR, {{Aℓ,t, Bℓ,t}1≤t≤nℓ}1≤ℓ≤n) exactly as in the above game
except that GSS is in witness indistinguishability setting as explained below. The adversary
A′, first generates params = (p,G1,G2,GT , e, g1, g2)← BilinearSetup(1ρ) by invoking algorithm
BilinearSetup discussed in section 2. The components {{Aℓ,t = g
aℓ,t
1 , Bℓ,t = g
aℓ,t
2 }1≤t≤nℓ}1≤ℓ≤n
are generated exactly as in Game 0. To generate GSS in witness indistinguishability setting and
GSR in perfectly sound setting, the algorithm chooses ξ1, ξ2, a˜, b˜, ξ̂1, ξ̂2, â, b̂
$
←− Zp and sets u1 =
(ga˜1 , 1, g1), u2 = (1, g
b˜
1, g1), u3 = u
ξ1
1 u
ξ2
2 (1, 1, g1) = (g
a˜ξ1
1 , g
b˜ξ2
1 , g
ξ1+ξ2+1
1 ), v1 = (g
a˜
2 , 1, g2), v2 =
(1, gb˜2, g2), v3 = v
ξ1
1 v
ξ2
2 (1, 1, g2) = (g
a˜ξ1
2 , g
b˜ξ2
2 , g
ξ1+ξ2+1
2 ), û1 = (g
â
1 , 1, g1), û2 = (1, g
b̂
1, g1), û3 =
ûξ̂11 û
ξ̂2
2 = (g
âξ̂1
1 , g
b̂ξ̂2
1 , g
ξ̂1+ξ̂2
1 ), v̂1 = (g
â
2 , 1, g2), v̂2 = (1, g
b̂
2, g2), v̂3 = v̂
ξ̂1
1 v̂
ξ̂2
2 = (g
âξ̂1
2 , g
b̂ξ̂2
2 , g
ξ̂1+ξ̂2
2 ),
GSS = (u1, u2, u3, v1, v2, v3), GSR = (û1, û2, û3, v̂1, v̂2, v̂3), t˜sim = (a˜, b˜, ξ1, ξ2), t̂ext = (â, b̂, ξ̂1, ξ̂2).
The adversary A′ distributes crs = (params,GSS, GSR, {{Aℓ,t, Bℓ,t}1≤t≤nℓ}1≤ℓ≤n) to all parties
and keeps t˜sim, t̂ext, {{aℓ,t}1≤t≤nℓ}1≤ℓ≤n hidden.
The common reference string crs simulated by A′ and crs generated by CrsSetup in actual
protocol run are computationally indistinguishable by Theorem 2.5 in section 2.1. Therefore,
there exists a negligible function ǫ1(ρ) such that |Pr[Game 1]− Pr[Game 0]| ≤ ǫ1(ρ).
Game 2: This game is exactly the same as Game 1 except that A′ extracts attribute list
L = [v1,t1 , v2,t2 , . . . , vn,tn ] from L
′ = {Rℓ}1≤ℓ≤n, ϕ sent by A in Issue phase as follows. The
proof ϕ = NIWIGSR{({Aℓ,tℓ , Tℓ}1≤ℓ≤n) | e(g1,
∏n
ℓ=1Rℓ) = e(
∏n
ℓ=1Aℓ,t, g2)e(
∏n
ℓ=1 Tℓ, g2)} was
constructed by A which consists of commitments to {Aℓ,tℓ , Tℓ}1≤ℓ≤n and proof components of
pairing equation e(g1,
∏n
ℓ=1Rℓ) = e(
∏n
ℓ=1Aℓ,t, g2) e(
∏n
ℓ=1 Tℓ, g2) using GSR = (û1, û2, û3, v̂1, v̂2,
v̂3) extracted from crs, simulated by A
′ in Game 1. The adversary A′ uses trapdoor t̂ext =
(â, b̂, ξ̂1, ξ̂2) to extract {Aℓ,tℓ , Tℓ}1≤ℓ≤n from their respective commitments as explained below.
For instance, let Com(Aℓ,tℓ) = µ1(Aℓ,tℓ)û
r̂1
1 û
r̂2
2 û
r̂3
3 = (X = g
â(r̂1+ξ̂1r̂3)
1 , Y = g
b̂(r̂2+ξ̂2r̂3)
1 , Z =
Aℓ,tℓ · g
r̂1+r̂2+r̂3(ξ̂1+ξ̂2)
1 ), where r̂1, r̂2, r̂3 are random values from Zp which were used to generate
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Com(Aℓ,tℓ). The adversary A
′ computes
Z
X
1
âY
1
b̂
=
Aℓ,tℓ · g
r̂1+r̂2+r̂3(ξ̂1+ξ̂2)
1
(g
â(r̂1+ξ̂1r̂3)
1 )
1
â (g
b̂(r̂2+ξ̂2r̂3)
1 )
1
b̂
= Aℓ,tℓ .
Similarly, A′ extracts all the witnesses {Aℓ,tℓ , Tℓ}1≤ℓ≤n. Let L be the set of attribute values
which is initially empty. The adversary A′ checks whether Aζ,ς = Aℓ,tℓ for ς = 1 to nζ , ζ = 1 to
n. If yes, set L = L ∪ {vℓ,tℓ}. In this way, A
′ recovers L = [v1,t1 , v2,t2 , . . . , vn,tn ] and simulates
d0, {d
′
ℓ,1, dℓ,2, dℓ,3}1≤ℓ≤n exactly as in above game.
The randomized attribute secret key ASK′ generated in Game 2 by A′ is distributed identically
to ASK′ honestly generated by the sender S. Hence, |Pr[Game 2]− Pr[Game 1]| = 0.
Game 3: This game is exactly the same as Game 2 except that A′ extracts the index σj
from the proof πσj = NIWIGSR{(c
(1)
σj ,
∏n
ℓ=1 c
(4)
σj ,ℓ
, g
vσj
2 , c
(2)
σj ) | e(
∏n
ℓ=1 c
(4)
σj ,ℓ
· y, c
(1)
σj ) = e(g1, g2) ∧
e(Reqσj , g2) = e(c
(2)
σj , g2)e(B, g
vσj
2 )} by extracting witnesses wit1 = c
(1)
σj , wit2 =
∏n
ℓ=1 c
(4)
σj ,ℓ
,
wit3 = g
vσj
2 , wit4 = c
(2)
σj using t̂ext exactly as A
′ has extracted Aℓ,tℓ in Game 2. The adver-
sary A′ checks whether c(1)i = wit1,
∏n
ℓ=1 c
(4)
i,ℓ = wit2, c
(2)
i = wit4 for i = 1, 2, . . . , N . Let
σj be the matching index. The adversary A
′ sends the message (transfer, σj) to FN×1AOT-HAP.
The ideal functionality returns mσj to A
′ if L satisfies the access policy Wσj associated with
mσj , otherwise, ⊥ is given to A
′. If no matching index σj found and the proof πσj is cor-
rect, then this means that σj /∈ {1, 2, . . . , N} and πσj is constructed by A for the ciphertext
φσj = (c
(1)
σj , c
(2)
σj , c
(3)
σj , c
(4)
σj , c
(5)
σj ). Eventually, this shows that A is able to construct a valid BB
signature c
(1)
σj , thereby A outputs c
(1)
σj as a forgery contradicting the fact that the BB signature
is unforgeable assuming q-SDH problem is hard [4]. Therefore, there exists a negligible function
ǫ3(ρ) such that |Pr[Game 3]− Pr[Game 2]| ≤ ǫ3(ρ).
Game 4: This game is the same as Game 3 except that the response Resσj and proof δσj are
simulated by A′, for each transfer phase j = 1, 2, . . . , k. To simulate response Res′σj , A
′ first
extracts hvσj from its commitment (Com′(h))vσj using t̂ext as done in Game 2. The commitment
to hvσj is generated by A by raising power vσj to the commitment of h given by S in initialization
phase as
(Com′(h))vσj = (gâ(r̂1+r̂3ξ̂1)2 , g
b̂(r̂2+r̂3ξ̂2)
2 , hg
r̂1+r̂2+r̂3(ξ̂1+ξ̂2))vσj
= (g
âvσj (r̂1+r̂3ξ̂1)
2 , g
b̂vσj (r̂2+r̂3ξ̂2)
2 , h
vσj gvσj (r̂1+r̂2+r̂3(ξ̂1+ξ̂2)))
= (g
â(r˜1+r˜3ξ̂1)
2 , g
b̂(r˜2+r˜3ξ̂2)
2 , h
vσj gr˜1+r˜2+r˜3(ξ̂1+ξ̂2)) = Com′(hvσj ),
where r˜1 = vσj r̂1, r˜2 = vσj r̂2, r˜3 = vσj r̂3, r̂1, r̂2, r̂3
$
←− Zp. The adversary A
′ sets c˜(5)σj ,ℓ = c
(5)
σj ,ℓ,tℓ
if
vℓ,tℓ ∈ L for ℓ = 1, 2, . . . , n and
Res′σj =
c
(3)
σj ·
∏n
ℓ=1 e(c
(4)
σj ,ℓ
, dℓ,1) · e(B,h
vσj )
e(c
(2)
σj , d0) ·
∏n
ℓ=1 e(c˜
(5)
σj ,ℓ
, dℓ,3) ·mσj
,
where L = [v1,t1 , v2,t2 , . . . , vn,tn ] and mσj are extracted in Game 2 and Game 3, respectively. The
proof
δσj = NIZKGSS{(a1,σj , a2,σj , a3,σj , a4,σj ) | e(Req
−1
σj
, a1,σj )e(a2,σj , a3,σj ) = 1∧
e(B−1, a1,σj )e(a4,σj , a3,σj ) = 1 ∧ e(g1, a3,σj ) = e(g1, g2)},
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where a1,σj = h, a2,σj = Req
γ
σj
, a3,σj = g2, a4,σj = B
γ . To simulate the proof δσj , A
′ sets
a1,σj = a2,σj = a3,σj = a4,σj = g
0
2 and generate commitment to all these values. As A
′ knows
the simulation trapdoor t˜sim, it can open the commitment to any value of its choice as explained
in Example ?? in section 2.1. The adversary A′ opens commitment of a3,σj to g
0
2 in first and 2nd
equation of δσj and to g
1
2 in 3rd equation of of δσj . Thus, all the equations in δσj are simulated
by A′.
Claim 1. Under the DLIN assumption, the response Resσj and the proof δσj honestly generated
by the sender S are computationally indistinguishable from the response Res′σj and proof δ
′
σj
simulated by the simulator A′.
Proof of Claim 1. The simulated response Res′σj is
Res′σj =
c
(3)
σj ·
∏n
ℓ=1 e(c
(4)
σj ,ℓ
, dℓ,1) · e(B,h
vσj )
e(c
(2)
σj , d0) ·
∏n
ℓ=1 e(c˜
(5)
σj ,ℓ
, dℓ,3) ·mσj
=
mσj · Y
rσj · e(Brσj , h) · e(B,hvσj )
mσj · Y
rσj
= e(B,h)rσj+vσj ,
as
∏n
ℓ=1 e(c
(4)
σj,ℓ
,dℓ,1)
e(c
(2)
σj
,d0)·
∏n
ℓ=1 e(c˜
(5)
σj,ℓ
,dℓ,3)
= 1
Y
rσj
and, the honestly generated response Resσj is
Resσj = e(Reqσj , h) = e(B
rσj+vσj , h) = e(B,h)rσj+vσj .
The simulated response Res′σj is distributed identically to honestly generated response Resσj .
As Groth-Sahai proofs are composable NIZK by Theorem 2.8, the simulated proof δ′σj is com-
putationally indistinguishable from the honestly generated proof δσj . Therefore, we have
|Pr[Game 4]− Pr[Game 3]| ≤ ǫ4(ρ), where ǫ4(ρ) is a negligible function.
Game 5: This game is the same as Game 4 except that A′ replaces perfect database DB =
{(mi,Wi)}1≤i≤N by a random database DB′ = {(m̂i, Ŵi)}1≤i≤N . The adversary A′ generates
(pk′, ψ′, cDB′), computes response Resσj , proof δσj . But, in this game the response Resσj is
computed on an invalid statement. The proof ψ′ is simulated exactly in the same way as A′
simulates δσj in Game 4. In Game 4, cDB is the encryption of perfect database DB whereas in
Game 5, cDB′ is the encryption of random database DB′. If the distinguisher Z can distinguish
between the transcript of Game 5 from the transcript of Game 4, we can construct a solver for
DLIN and DBDH using Z as a subroutine – a contradiction as CP-ABE of [26] is semantically
secure assuming the hardness of DLIN and DBDH problems. Therefore, Game 4 and Game 5
are computationally indistinguishable and |Pr[Game 5] − Pr[Game 4]| ≤ ǫ5(ρ), where ǫ5(ρ) is a
negligible function.
Thus Game 5 is the ideal world interaction whereas Game 0 is the real world interaction. Now
|Pr[Game 5]− [Game 0]| ≤
∑5
t=1 |Pr[Game t]− [Game (t− 1)]| ≤ ǫ6(ρ), where ǫ6(ρ) =
∑5
t=1 ǫt(ρ)
is a negligible function. Hence, IDEALFN×1
AOT-HAP,A′,Z
c
≈ REALΠ,A,Z .
(b) Security Against Malicious Sender S. In this case, A corrupts the sender S and
delivers all messages on behalf of S. The adversary A′ simulates the actions of R as follows.
Game 0: This game corresponds to the real world protocol interaction in which S communicates
with honest R. So, Pr[Game 0] = 0.
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Game 1: This game is the same as Game 0 except that A′ simulates crs = (params,GSS ,GSR,
{{Aℓ,t, Bℓ,t}1≤t≤nℓ}1≤ℓ≤n). The adversary A
′, first generates params = (p,G1,G2,GT , e, g1, g2)
by invoking algorithm BilinearSetup discussed in section 2. The components {Aℓ,t = g
aℓ,t
1 , Bℓ,t =
g
aℓ,t
2 }1≤t≤nℓ,1≤ℓ≤n, are generated exactly as in Game 0. To generate GSS and GSR in perfectly
sound setting, the algorithm, takes ξ1, ξ2, a˜, b˜, ξ̂1, ξ̂2, â, b̂
$
←− Zp and sets u1 = (g
a˜
1 , 1, g1), u2 =
(1, gb˜1, g1), u3 = (g
a˜ξ1
1 , g
b˜ξ2
1 , g
ξ1+ξ2
1 ), v1 = (g
a˜
2 , 1, g2), v2 = (1, g
b˜
2, g2), v3 = (g
a˜ξ1
2 , g
b˜ξ2
2 , g
ξ1+ξ2
2 ), û1 =
(gâ1 , 1, g1), û2 = (1, g
b̂
1, g1), û3 = (g
âξ̂1
1 , g
b̂ξ̂2
1 , g
ξ̂1+ξ̂2
1 ), v̂1 = (g
â
2 , 1, g2), v̂2 = (1, g
b̂
2, g2), v̂3 = (g
âξ̂1
2 ,
gb̂ξ̂22 , g
ξ̂1+ξ̂2
2 ), GSS = (u1, u2, u3, v1, v2, v3),GSR = (û1, û2, û3, v̂1, v̂2, v̂3), t˜ext = (a˜, b˜, ξ1, ξ2), t̂ext =
(â, b̂, ξ̂1, ξ̂2). The adversaryA
′ distributes crs to all parties and keeps t˜ext, t̂ext, {{aℓ,t}1≤t≤nℓ}1≤ℓ≤n
secret to itself.
The common reference string crs generated in Game 1 by A′ is distributed identically to crs
generated in Game 0 by CrsSetup. Hence, |Pr[Game 1]− Pr[Game 0]| = 0.
Game 2: This game is the same as Game 1 except that A′ upon receiving pk, ψ, cDB from A
extracts h, gw2 , g
α
1 , g
α
2 using t˜ext in the same way as A
′ extracts witnesses in Game 2 of Case (a).
Using extracted h, gw2 , g
α
2 , A
′ extracts (mi,Wi) from ciphertext φi for each i = 1, 2, . . . , N as
follows. The adversary A′ extracts c(2)i = B
ri , c
(3)
i = mi · Y
ri · e(c
(2)
i , h), c
(4)
i = {c
(4)
i,ℓ }1≤ℓ≤n =
{g
si,ℓ
1 }1≤ℓ≤n, c
(5)
i = {{c
(5)
i,ℓ,t}1≤t≤nℓ}1≤ℓ≤n from φi = (c
(1)
i , c
(2)
i , c
(3)
i , c
(4)
i , c
(5)
i ) and computes
c
(3)
i
e
(∏n
ℓ=1 c
(4)
i,ℓ , g
w
2
)
e(c
(2)
i , h)
=
mi · Y
rie(Bri , h)
e
(∏n
ℓ=1 g
si,ℓ
1 , g
w
2
)
e(Bri , h)
=
mi · Y
rie(Bri , h)
e
(
g
∑n
ℓ=1 si,ℓ
1 , g
w
2
)
e(Bri , h)
= mi
as
∑n
ℓ=1 si,ℓ = ri, Y = e(g1, g
w
2 ). Let Wi = [Wi,1,Wi,2, . . . ,Wi,n] be the access policy associated
withmi which is initially empty. The adversary A
′ checks whether e((c(5)i,ℓ,t)
1
aℓ,t , g2) = e(c
(4)
i,ℓ , g
α
2 ),
if yes, Wi,ℓ =Wi,ℓ ∪{vℓ,t} for t = 1, 2, . . . , nℓ, for ℓ = 1, 2, . . . , n. In this way, Wi is recovered by
A′. The adversary A′ sends (initdb,DB = {mi,Wi}1≤i≤N ) to FN×1AOT-HAP. Upon receiving message
(issue, L), A′ simulates R’s side of the Issue phase. The adversary A′ picks attributes, constructs
attribute list L˜ = [v1,t1 , v2,t2 , . . . , vn,tn ] such that L˜ |=W1 and simulates Rℓ by taking Bℓ,tℓ , from
crs, corresponding to vℓ,tℓ from L˜ and sets L
′ = {Rℓ}1≤ℓ≤n, where Rℓ = Bℓ,tℓ · g
zℓ
2 . The proof ϕ
is simulated with the witnesses {Aℓ,tℓ , Tℓ}1≤ℓ≤n, where Tℓ = g
zℓ
1 . The proof ϕ and L
′ is given
to A who in turn gives randomized attribute key ASK′ = (d0 = g
w+s
β
2 , {d
′
ℓ,1 = g
s
2 · R
λℓ
ℓ , dℓ,2 =
gλℓ2 , dℓ,3 = g
λℓ
α
2 }1≤ℓ≤n). The adversary A
′ checks whether
e(g1,d′ℓ,1·d
−zℓ
ℓ,2 )e(g
α
1 ,dℓ,3)
e(B,d0)e(g
−1
1 ,g
w
2 )
= e(Aℓ,tℓ ·g1, dℓ,2)
for ℓ = 1, 2, . . . , n. If yes, a bit b = 1 to given to FN×1AOT-HAP by A
′. Otherwise, A′ gives b = 0 to
FN×1AOT-HAP.
As Groth-Sahai proofs are composable NIWI by Theorem 2.8, the simulated L′, ϕ are computa-
tionally indistinguishable from the honestly generated L′, ϕ. Therefore, we have |Pr[Game 2]−
Pr[Game 1]| ≤ ǫ1(ρ), where ǫ1(ρ) is a negligible function.
Game 3: This game is the same as Game 2 except thatA′ upon receiving the message (transfer, σj),
runs the receiver R’s side of the Transfer phase. The adversary A′ simulates Reqσj , πσj as fol-
lows. The adversary A′ replaces Reqσj by Req1 = c
(2)
1 ·B
v1 and proof πσj by π1 = NIWIGSR{(c
(1)
1 ,∏n
ℓ=1 c
(4)
1,ℓ , g
v1
2 , c
(2)
1 ) | e(
∏n
ℓ=1 c
(4)
1,ℓ · y, c
(1)
1 ) = e(g1, g2) ∧ e(Req1, g2) = e(c
(2)
1 , g2)e(B, g
v1
2 )}, Pri1 =
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Hv1 . The adversary A′ gives π1 and Req1 to A. Upon receiving response Res1, δ1 from A, A′
checks whether
c
(3)
1 ·
∏n
ℓ=1 e(c
(4)
1,ℓ ,dℓ,1)·Hv1
e(c
(2)
1 ,d0)·
∏n
ℓ=1 e(c˜
(5)
1,ℓ ,dℓ,3)·Res1
= m1. If yes, a bit b = 1 to given to F
N×1
AOT-HAP by
A′. Otherwise, A′ gives b = 0 to FN×1AOT-HAP. As Groth-Sahai proofs are composable NIWI by
Theorem 2.8, the simulated request Req1 is computationally indistinguishable from the hon-
estly generated Reqσj . Therefore, we have |Pr[Game 3] − Pr[Game 2]| ≤ ǫ2(ρ), where ǫ2(ρ) is a
negligible function
Thus Game 3 is the ideal world interaction whereas Game 0 is the real world interaction. Now
|Pr[Game 3] − [Game 0]| =
∑3
t=1 |Pr[Game t]− [Game (t − 1)]|, where ǫ3(ρ) = ǫ2(ρ) + ǫ1(ρ) + 0
is a negligible function. Hence, IDEALFN×1
AOT-HAP,A′,Z
c
≈ REALΠ,A,Z .
5 Comparison
We compare our proposed issuer-free adaptive oblivious transfer with hidden access policy
(AOT-HAP) with [2], [8], [10], [19]. The subtle differences between our scheme and [2], [8], [10],
[19] are listed below.
1. The schemes of [8], [10] and [19], to the best of our knowledge, are the only existing
AOT-HAP, but they are not secure in UC framework.
2. Abe et al. [2] introduced the first adaptive oblivious transfer with access policy in UC
framework, but access policies are not hidden.
3. Guleria and Dutta [20] presented the concept of issuer-free adaptive oblivious transfer
with public access policies.
4. The schemes [2], [8], [10], [19] assume an issuer apart from a sender and multiple receivers
in their constructions and are secure under the restriction that the issuer never colludes
with a set of receivers.
UC Secure Pairing Exponentiation Hidden
Schemes PO EXP AP
Transfer DBSetup Transfer DBSetup CRSG
[2] (100n + 199)k (n+ 21)N (138n + 237)k (2n + 21)N + 2n+ 20 n+ 26 ×
[20] 2
k∑
j=1
nσj + 86k N + 2 96k 3
N∑
i=1
ni + 3N + 59 10 ×
Ours (2n+ 149)k N + 2 112k ≤ ((m + n+ 3)N + 112) 2m + 20 √
Table 1 Comparison Summary of computation cost in k transfer phases and initialization phase (PO
stands for number of pairing operations, EXP for number of exponentiation operations, CRSG for crs
generation, and AP for access control, n is the number of attributes, m is total number of values which
n attributes can take, N is the database size).
In contrast to [2], [8], [10], [19], we introduce the first issuer-free AOT-HAP in UC framwork. Our
AOT-HAP is issuer-free, realizes hidden access policy and achieves UC security. Table 1 provides
the computation cost involved in k Transfer phases, in algorithms DBSetup and CRSSetup. In
addition, issue phase takes 20n + 8 exponentiations and 2n + 15 pairing. Table 2 exhibits (i)
communication cost in k transfer phases, (ii) storage complexity of common reference string
crs, (iii) storage complexity of ciphertext database and public key size and (iv) complexity
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UC Secure Communication Storage Security Assumptions Issuer-Free
Schemes
Request + Response crs-Size (cDB + pk)Size –
[2] (125 + 64n)k n+ 28 16N + n+ 20 SXDH, XDLIN ×
[20] 47Gk 11G
(
N∑
i=1
ni + 3N +m + 11
)
G DLIN, q-SDH , q-DBDHE
√
Ours 62k 2m+ 22 ≤ ((m + n+ 3)N + 7) q-SDH, DBDH, DLIN √
Table 2 Comparison summary of communication cost in k transfer phases and initialization phase (cDB
stands for ciphertext database, pk for public key, n is the number of attributes, m is total number of
values which n attributes can take, N is the database size, SXDH - symmetric external Diffie-Hellman
assumption, XDLIN -external decision Linear assumption, q-SDH - q-strong Diffie-Hellman assumption,
DBDH-decision bilinear Diffie-Hellman assumption, DBDHE-decision bilinear Diffie-Hellman exponent
assumption, DLIN-decision Linear assumption).
assumption. As illustrated in Table 1 and 2, our protocol is more efficient as compared to the
only existing UC secure adaptive oblivious without hidden access policy.
6 Conclusion
We have proposed the first issuer-free adaptive oblivious transfer with hidden access policy
(AOT-HAP) in universal composable (UC) framework. In issuer-free AOT-HAP, the sender
publishes the ciphertext database encrypted under associated access policies. The receiver
interacts with the sender in order to decrypt the messages of its choice without revealing its
identity, attribute set and choice of messages. The receiver either recovers the correct message
or a garbage one depending upon whether the receiver’s attribute set satisfies the access policy
associated with the message. The proposed AOT-HAP has been proved UC secure under the
hardness of q-strong Diffie-Hellman (SDH), decision Linear (DLIN) and decision bilinear Diffie-
Hellman (DBDH) problems in the presence of malicious adversary. Moreover, the protocol is
efficient as compared to the existing similar schemes.
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